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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has juristiction in this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as
amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether defendant was denied a fair trial by

failure of plaintiff to properly answer a specific written
interrogatory asking how she could have got the jewelry.
standard of review Is abuse of discretion.

The

Marshall v. Van

Gerven, 790 P.2d 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
2.

Whether some findings of fact regarding specific

items of jewelry are clearly contrary to the evidence.

The

standard of review is clear error (lacking any supporting
evidence).

Butler v. Lee, 77^ P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. App„ 1989).
3.

Whether some findings of fact regarding specific

items of jewelry are based upon Insufficient evidence.

The

standard of review is clear error (against clear weight of
evidence).

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah

1989).
4.

Whether valuations of jewelry set out in findings

of fact are excessive.

The standard of review is clear error

(against clear weight of evidence).

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha

Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).
5. Whether punitive damages are exessive.

1

A new

standard of review was declared March 4, 1991, by the United
States Supreme Court requiring careful scrutinization by trial
courts and appeal courts.
499 U.S.

(1991).

Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,

The existing Utah standard of review is

clear error (any substantial evidence not manifesting passion
and prejudice).
6.

Evans v. Gaisford, 247 P.2d 431 (Utah 1952).
should

Whether the burdon of

proof on punitive damages/be

higher than mere preponderance of evidence.
review is correction of error.

The standard of

Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 139

(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
7.

Whether plaintiff had standing to sue under the

Utah Uniform Probate Code, that is, whether the trial court
erred in denying defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss for
failure to join the personal representative of the estate of the
decedent as the real party in Interest and an indispensable
party to preclude multiple actions on the same claim.

The

standard of review apparently Is de novo under Shaw v. Jeppson,
239 P.2d 745 (Utah 1952).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought this action for replevin of his
deceased wife's jewelry or its value, plus punitive damages,
against defendant and her husband^ claiming defendant and her
husband stole the jewelry from plaintiff's residence.

Defendant

and her husband filed their answer to the complaint denying theft,

2

and claiming plaintiff was not married to his deceased common
law wife, had no claim to the jewelry as an heir or otherwise,
had no standing to bring this action under the Utah Uniform
Probate Code, that the value of the jewelry was substanally
less than alleged in the complaint, that one ring was a family
heirloom of defendant's family, and that plaintiff made an
unconditional gift of the jewelry to defendant-

Defendant's

pretrial motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff had no
standing to bring an action to recover the deceased's jewelry (1)
under the Utah Uniform Probate Code and (2) because he was not
married to decedent, was denied on the grounds that plaintiff's
marital status was disputed.

The trial court never specifically

ruled on the issue regarding standing to sue under the probate
code, before or after trial.

The case was tried without jury.

At trial the case against defendant's husband was dismissed for
lack of any evidence connecting him to the jewelry . (defendant's
husband died shortly after the trial).

The trial court found

there was a valid "common law" marriage between plaintiff and
the decedant under §30-l-I(.5, U.C.A. 1953, which finding is not
appealed.

Judgment for plaintiff for $7,598.00 for remainder of

jewelry not returned to plaintiff in open court at trial, plus
$3,000.00 punitive damages.

Defendant appealed all of the

findings and judgment except the trial court's determination that
a "common law" marriage existed under statute.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
PlaintiffTs "common lawn wife, Janet, died intestate,
survived by him and her son.

(Tr 12, 20, 40, 84 & 85)

The son's

whereabouts was unknown and he was not made a party to this case.
(Tr 42, 43 & 58)
16)

There was no probate.

(Statement of Facts at CR

Defendant was the decedent's sister.

(Tr 4)

Plaintiff

claimed defendant stole (converted) jewelry from his residence.
(Tr 87 & 90)

The jewelry was the decedent's sole and separate

property and in her possession at the time of her death.
97)
93

(Tr 78 &

The jewelry could not be found after decedent's death.
20, 25 & 29)

(Tr 8,

During decedent's funeral the police searched

plaintiff's home for stolen property but did not list any jewelry
on the inventory left at the home.

(Tr 93)

Plaintiff testified

that he discovered the jewelry was gone when he saw it advertised
for sale in the Big Nickel.

(Tr 89)

Also, plaintiff testified

that defendant had a key to his home (Tr 8 5 , 86, 88 & 9 9 ) , a fact
not disclosed in his unsigned answers to interrogatories (Answer to
Interrogatories H5, at CR 67). Defendant testified that she
searched for the jewelry in plaintiff's home at his request and in
his presence, found it, gave it to him, and he gave it back to her
as an unconditional gift (Tr

7 to 13, 20, 25, 26, 28 & 29),'but

later had a conditiQn in mind (Tr 18, 19, 33 & 34). The items of
jewelry defendant got and values are disputed throughout the record.
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SUMMARY

OF

ARGUMENT

This case went to trial because defendants counsel
could not figure out how defendant could possibly have got the
jewelry out of plaintiff's home without him knowing it, or at
least having a reasonable theory as to how it could be done.
was the key to the whole case.
"explain how she got it."

That

So defendant asked plaintiff to

From plaintiff's Answer to Interrogatory

No. 5 one would reasonably assume plaintiff had no evidence as to
"how she got it," nor a reasonable theory on this key question.
Counsel discovered the Answers to Interrogatories were not signed
while typing Point I and corrected Statment of facts and Summary
which is why the failure to sign Is not mentioned before.

After

all this time it is apparent that plaintiff will never complete
discovery, that further discovery would be useless under the
circumstances, and the judgment snould be set aside with prejudice.
The Trial Court allowed that "I think there was more
jewelry taken than what the Court's been made aware of," and then
made
proceeded to make a list of such jewelry It was not/aware of by
reliable evidence.
After the trial the United States Supreme Court held
that punitive damages may be awarded under the Constitution, but
current common law guidelines do not provide adequate safeguards.
Before Pacific Mutual came down on March 4, 1991, defendant

5

defendant complained to the Trial Court that existing standards
were not sufficient to meet the requirement that punitive damages
should be awarded with great caution.

Pacific Mutual indicates

that standards that require more, rather than less, trial court
and appeal court scrutinization of punitive damages is the
preferred policy.
The Trial Court did not exercise much caution is awarding
punitive damages in this case, although requested to so do.

The

Trial Court did not even follow existing guidelines to safeguard
against passion and prejudice in awarding punitive damages.
Trial Court should observe the same safeguards as a jury.

The

When

asked to apply a standard of clear and convincing evidence, the
Trial Court ruled it would not make any difference in this case
because the Trial Court was convinced
doubt.

TT

beyond all reasonable

As we all know, this is a degree of evidence much more

sure than clear and convincing."

The Trial Court's statement

reveals prejudice against defendant, and an error of law.
The record as a whole shows unfairness:

conflicts in

testimony were used as grounds for awarding punitive damages,
damages were assessed at double fair market value, defendant's
financial and social position was not considered

in

awarding punitive damages, and the clear weight of evidence was
grossly exaggerated.

Tina may not be any better than the rest of

us, but she is not as bad as tne Trial Court makes her out to be.
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY PLAINTIFF'S
TOTAL AND DECEPTIVE FAILURE TO ANSWER A SPECIFIC
INTERROGATORY ASKING HOW SHE COULD HAVE GOT THE
JEWELRY.

This :! s d e f e n d a n t s mair 1 p o i n t and t h e main reason counsel
advised her to appeal.

Please note there has been a change In

emphasis on this point from plaintiff's failure to "properly answer"
as set -Mil In defendant's memorandum In support of motion for new
trial (TR 5 3 ) , defendant's Docketing Statement at paragraplt 8, Point
1 3 and Statement of Issues in this brief at paragrapl:i I ,, to
plaintiff's "total and deceptive failure to answer."

Defendant's

counsel had unwittingly relied on his copy of plaintiff's Answers to
Interrogatories which ended up In the Trial Court fi ] e «

?R 19-22.

Under Rule 4-502(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration and that
rule's predecessors the party requesting discovery gets only a copy,
not the original of the response, a major defect iiI thj i: rule as this
case 1llustrates.

While counsel was preparing the Summary of

Argument In this brief he happened to refer to the original Answers
to Interrogatories which ended up In the Trial Court file at TR 6568, and discovered to his astonishment that it was not signed.

No

notice Is taken of the lack of a signature on copies of Court
documents which are often mailed, out after one of several copies is
signed without re-copying the signed copy for mailing and service.
The Rule 4-502(1) Certificate of Service (TR 10) implies there is a
signed copy or original.

The fact that plaintiffs Answers to

7

Interrogatories is not signed explains why there is no similarity
between Answer to Interrogatory No. 5
about defendant having a key to
99)

and p3aintifffs testimony

his residence.

(Tr. 65, 86, 88 &

Obviously, plaintiff never saw the Answers to Interrogatories.

Defendant filed this appeal based on the substance of plaintiff's
answers to interrogatories and his testimony to *a fact asked for
but not disclosed by discovery, having no good reason to know the
answers to interrogatories were not signed or even seen by plaintiff.
Had plaintiff answered the interrogatories we would not be here in
the Supreme Court contending the rules of discovery.

We probably

would not have even gone to trial, not without being prepared with
some evidence to rebut the key testimony of plaintiff, and then
not without a jury, had plaintiff answered Interrogarory No. 5.
Defendant's counsel could not understand how defendant could have
obtained the jewerly from plaintiff's residence without plaintiff
knowing it, so he asked plaintiff to "explain how she got It,ff but
received no answer.

Defendant submits the 3-line response is not

an answer other than to declare plaintiff does not know the answer.
If a discovery response reasonably indicates the party does not
know the answer, there is no reason to compel further discovery from
the answering party on the subject.

Based on plaintiff's Answer to

Interrogatory No. 5 defendant went to trial with the reasonable
assumption plaintiff did not have an explanation or even a theory as
to how she could have got the jewelry out of his residence without
his knowledge.

In preparation for trial counsel questioned defendant

8

extensively about how she could have possibly got tile jewelry out
of plaintiffTs residence without his knowledge because plaintiff
did not have a reasonable explanation on this point.

Defendant did

not tell her counsel about the key, and her r.ounue] never aksed her
about keys.
used the key.

The substance of defendant's testimony is she never
How defendant got the jewelry out of the residence

was the key to this case.

To try a his-word-agalnst-her-word case
Plaintiff1s key testimony

you must have some credibility.

destroyed defendant's credibility.

Plaintiff's surprise key

testirrioily destroyed defendant's credibility with a blind-side
sucker punch, all contrary to the most fundamental requirements of
Rules 26(g) and 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, w!lich
are contrued under Rule 1 to secure a "just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action,"
POINTS II, 111 & IV
THE FINDINGS OP FACT AS TO SOME ITEMS IF JEWELRY
LACK SUPPORTING EVIDENCE AND GO AGAINST THE CLEAR
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, AND VALUATIONS ARE EXCESSIVE.
These points are combined to shorten and sinip] ify the
argument. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentaryevidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.
Rule 520-0, URCP.

Defendant raised the question of the.

sufficiency of the evidence In the Trial Court, although not
necessary for appeal.

Rule 52(b), URCP.

The basis of the Trial CourtTs findings must be

9

articulated with detail sufficient to permit review by a court of
appeal.

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).

The Trial Court articulated the basis of its findings: "I think there
was more jewelry taken than what the CourtTs been made aware of,"
(Tr 144)

Awarding damages for jewelry the Trial Court was not "made

aware of" is "clearly erroneous," and that is what the Trial Court
did.

Also, the Trial Court took evidence of fair market value and

and awarded exactly double fair market value, which is "clearly
erroneous."
For simplicity, there are 2 lists of jewelry with values:
(1) by defendant at page 60 of the Court Record and (2) by the Trial
Court at page 36 of the Court Record.

There is no such listing or

organized testimony by plaintiff, although the Trial Court did put
its list together from plaintiff's exhibits consisting of randum and
miscellaneous documents.

Defendant's testimony confirms the listing

and values set forth in her affidavit at Court Record 60 (Tr 10, 11,
13, 14, 48 & 5 5 ) , and her testimony refers to her affidavit at Tr 12,
35, 36 & 37.

Defendant's valuations are based on actual sales in the

open market.

Plaintiff's testimony about jewelry and values is based

on randum and miscellaneous receipts and other papers found laying
around the house, Exhibits 3,, 5, 7, 8 & 9, incorporated into the Trial
Court's Ruling of Valuations at CR 36.

(Tr 68, 69, 70, 71, 73 & 74)

Plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that if he found a jewelry
receipt, certificate, appraisal, or some such paper, then it
necessarily follows that defendant converted the jewelry described

10

therein

Tl le Trial Court accepted plaintiff 1 s reasoi i:5 i i g :I i i .makii ig

i t s Ruling on Valuations because "I think there was more jewelry
(Tr I1! li)

takte.n ..than what the Court's been made award of."
is not a correct application o f evidence to the

That

Plai-* !' *'

testified the value o f jewelry converted by defendant "A] 1
totaled 11 was "About 1 5 , 0 0 0 ; because they were bought out of my
retire me i 1 :•, ",

(T r 79 )

Th e rest of plaint i f fT s e v i d e n c e c : f

jewelry converted and values was equally p r o b a t i v e .
7 5 , 76 & 77)

(Tr 7 2 , 7'I «,

A p p a r e n t l y , the Trial Court found "All totaled

,.

About 1 5 ,3 000"'! was right o n the nailhead because :! f j c I i add the
Trial Cokrt's total values o f $7,598 to d e f e n d a n t ! s valuations of
items returned to p l a i n t i f f o f $5,700 the subtotal comes to
$ 1 3 , 2 9 8 , there being some items sold.
E x a m i n i n g Exhibits 3, 5 , 7 , 8 & 9 reveals the Trial
Court took the highest figures found in those exhibits to
determine values exactly double fair market v a l u e .

Exhibit 5 ,

selling price $ 1 1 1 . 0 4 , "merchandise d e s c r i p t i o n " 2 2 5 , Trial Court
value "$225.

Exhibit 7* selling price $407 - 249 , regular price

$81 5, Ti >ial Court value $815.

Exhibit 8 , selling price $ 5 8 2 . ^ 9 ,

regular price $ 1 , 1 6 5 , Trial Court value $1,1.65.

Exhibit 9,

selling price $ 2 5 9 . 9 9 3 regular price $ 6 5 0 , Trial Court value $ 6 5 0 .
Ti ie ? measi ire < )f value o f property is the fair market value at the
time and place o f c o n v e r s i o n , the price
buyers u n d e r n o compulsion would reach.
of value is '"

. more .

willing sellers and
The Trial Court's

than made award o f . "

11

measure

.

Defendant complains bitterly that the Trial Court wants
her to pay for the ring her sister was buried with.

(Tr 99)

Nor

does she think it fair to pay for jewelry her sister wore when she
died and was lost at the hospital.

(Tr 96 & 99)

The plaintiff

testified he did not know what jewelry his wife had at the time of
her death.

(Tr 100)

The Trial Court did not know either, but

allowed it was more "than what the Court's been made award of."
(Tr 144)

Nevertheless, the Trial Court was confortable in its

findings, for example:

"In this case, the evidence was so one

sided that the Court could have found the evidence against the
defendant, Gina Taylor, beyond all reasonable doubt."

Ruling on

Motion (CR 71).
POINT V
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE EXCESSIVE
The Pacific Mutual case came down after this case was
finally decided.
(1991).

Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.

Eight participating Justices produced 4 opinions.

Although punitive damages are seldom awarded and not often
upheld on appeal they are too often asked for because current common
law guidelines allow It.

Pacific Mutual sends a clear

message that state courts and legislatures should re-examine state
standards on punitive damages to make sure punitive damage awards
are reasonable and carefully scrutinized by trial and appeal courts.
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Pacific Mutual is an acknowledgement that punitive damages are
allowed to be asked for too often under current common law
standards.

The old common law standards worked very well because

punitive damages were seldom awarded and less seldom upheld on
appeal, but now there is a perception that punitive damage
awards are increasing in number and amounts accompanied by a
decreasing willingness of appeal courts to overrule trial courts.
Defendant complains that her punitive damages are
excessive under common law standards.

Under Utah law

The only limitation thereon is that they must not
be so disproportionate to the injury and the
actual damage as to plainly manifest that they
were the result of passion and prejudice rather
than reason and justice applied to the existing
facts.
Evans v. Gaisford, 2^7 P.2d 431 (1952) does not meet Pacific
Mutual standards, and the Trial CourtTs handling of this case does
not meet Evans standards.

A $3,000.00 punitive damage award

against a low income, relatively powerless widow with orphan.
children invites careful scrutinization on appeal.

If the

justification of punitive damages is the promotion of social
justice, than widows and orphans make relevant argument.
Singular evidence of passion and prejudice is shown by
the Trial CourtTs Ruling on Motion for New Trial.

(CR 71)

In this case, the evidence was so one sided that
the Court could have found the evidence against
the defendant, Gina Taylor, beyond all reasonable
doubt. As we all know, this Is a decree of
evidence much more sure than clear and convincing.

13

As we all who practice in criminal court know, beyond all
reasonable doubt is a higher decree of proof than beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The use of the words

"beyond all reasonable

doubt" seldom escapes Immediate correction by Trial Courts in
criminal cases because it implies absolute proof, an impossibility,
a singularity adhored by nature and law.
POINT VI
THE BURDON OF PROOF ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE
HIGHER THAN A MERE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
If trial courts are going to start awarding punitive
damages more often the burden of proof should be Increased as an
additional safeguard against overuse of punitive damages.
Pacific Mutual clearly Invites the states to re-think punitive
damage standards as such a safeguard.

This was a his-word-against-

her-word case with a key surprise thrown In to boot.

If punitive

damages can be awarded simply because the trier of fact believes
one party against another then punitive damages would be open to
consideration is most cases involving conflicts in testimony.
Since conflicts-In-testimony cases are resolved by a mere
preponderance of evidence then a higher decree of proof on punitive
dcimages would eliminate punitive damage considerations from such
cases.
POINT VII
PLINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE AND FAILED
TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY AFTER NOTICE.
This point was made In defendant's Motions and supporting Statments of Points and Authorities filed before and after

trial, but not specifically ruled on by the Trial Court.
Failure to join the real party in interest within a
reasonable time after objection is grounds for dismissal.
(b)(7) & 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rules 12

Defendant has

a right to demand the real party in interest be joined to preclude
multiple actions on the same claim.
(Utah 1952).

Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 7^5

Janetfs son could have her estate probated and the

personal representative could bring action against defendant on the
same claim, regardless of plaintifffs marital status and regardless
of whether defendant obtained the jewelry by conversion or gift.
Plaintiff did not have standing to sue without joining the
personal representative of the estate of Janet.
CONCLUSION
This case should be sent back to the Trial Court for a
new trial, or at least remanded with remittitur of judgment.
DATED:

May 28, 1991.

^Cc-iJ
<>( X
^^j.
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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attached Brief of Appellant upon David J. Knowlton, attorney
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